Abstract. The past decade has seen a remarkable turn towards the cultural in human geography. This shift has been marked by a strange gap between theory and empirical practice. Radical though the turn to the cultural has been in reconstituting the ways that human geography thinks of itself as a discipline, its impact on ways that geographers actually do empirical research has been in certain respects relatively limited. Indeed, while the cultural turn has become strongly associated with a valorisation of qualitative methodologies, the actual range of methods used has been relatively narrow. Drawing on the work of Nigel Thrift and a range of other human geographers who are exploring the metaphor of performance to understand this realm of practical action, I argue that not only can social action be viewed as performance, so too is it productive to reframe the research process itself as a kind of performance. This reframing allows for a more experimental and more flexible attitude towards both the production and interpretation of research evidence. It also makes it easier to think of new ways of engaging with how individuals and groups inhabit their worlds through practical action. Drawing on my own experimentation with written and photographic research diaries, I explore a number of ways through which the performative ethos can inform and invigorate the human geographic imagination. I conclude by arguing that human geography needs to be more imaginative, pluralistic, and pragmatic in its attitude towards both (a) methodology and (b) the kinds of final research accounts it produces.
(see Gregory, 1996; Peet, 1998) . But we do not seem to have made much progress in rethinking what this should mean to us as researchers. As Pratt (2000, page 639) writes, as human geographers``we have yet ... to put much of our theoretical talk into research practices. Our talk may be that of poststructuralists, postcolonialists, or social constructivists, but our practice continues to be that of colonising humanists.' ' Pratt believes that human geography's methodological conservativism is in large part a result of disciplinary unease at reflecting too intimately on individual research practices. Perhaps. But equally it can be argued that human geographers have taken postmodern and poststructuralist critiques of traditional social scientific methods too much to heart (see Clifford, 1988; Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Denzin, 1997) . The result has been that, rather than simply freeing us from the burdens of an earlier physicalscience-based paradigm of social scientific investigation and opening up new research possibilities, the cultural critiques of the 1990s have in certain respects enfeebled human geography as an empirical discipline. What the work of the writers mentioned aboveöalong with Thrift's call for a wider methodological horizonöis beginning to map out is a series of routes through which our`theoretical talk' can be used not only to interrogate established methodologies, but also to enliven more positively our vision of what human-geography methodologies might be (see also Crang, 1994; McCormack, 2001; Malborn, 1999) . It also marks a renewedöand welcomedöwillingness after a period of disciplinary introspection to wholeheartedly engage with the complex, messy world of empirically focused work.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this opening of methodological horizons within human geography. Specifically, I want to contribute to the emerging discussion on the uses and limits of the metaphor of performance as a way to frame the research process (see Gregson and Rose, 2000; Nash, 2000; Pratt, 2000; Rose, 1999; Smith, 2000; Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000) . What I want to show is how reframing research as creative, performative practice allows the researcher to address some novel questions about the cultures of everyday urban experience that more conventional, representationally oriented, methods fail to address adequately. I want also to demonstrate how such a reframing involves a reappraisal of our relationship to our research subjects and the narratives they offer. Thus, I am interested in the ideas of performance and practice on two discrete levels. First, I seek to articulate an understanding of everyday urban public culture as embodied practiceöa practice that is creative, pregnant with possibilities, but nonetheless located within particular networks of power/knowledge (compare Bourdieu, 1984; Foucault, 1980) . Second, drawing on this conceptualisation of everyday life (or`ordinary culture'), I attempt to outline how the processes of`fieldwork' and interpretation can embody, enact, and thus respect the creativity of social practice whilst still offering useful (and critical) accounts of that practice.
2 Joseph's Ponsonby Road`S tarted work, Star Graphics, 8.00 am. 208 Ponsonby Rd, opposite Franklin Rd. 10.30 am, Morning Tea. Left work to get coffee at`Duo', walkedöjust across Rd, opposite`Tuatara'. Talked with Scottie, (who works there and has become some-what of a friend), asked how Weekend was e.t.c. Ordered Single Flat White, which Scott added his artistic touch to by drawing a pattern in the froth with a spoon, (He always does this!). Sat outside and flicked through`Herald', while drinking and having a smoke. Scottie came out and joined Me, as there was no one else in the cafe. Talked some more. Joined a few minutes later by Gail (fellow patron, and friend of Scott). A nice unplanned encounter. Went back to work, at approx 10.45 am. Coffee was great as usual. '' Research diary entry Joseph, 27, actor, copy-shop assistant, coffee drinker performances which are a part of this, also resonate with trends analysed elsewhere (see Hebdige, 1988; Mort, 1996; Segal, 1990) . And the more general questions that have shaped political arguments about the roadöarguments about deviancy, difference, and mainstream norms of social behaviour öflow directly into ongoing debates about what (and for whom) the public and quasi-public spaces of the city should be for (compare Sennett, 1990; see also Latham, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2003a; Young, 1990) . And yet, if we return to Joseph, to what he is doing in Duo, a limit on these generalisations is apparent. If we can see elements of the above trends in Joseph's actions, what is also apparent is how he is engaged in an (often subtle) dialogue with the people and objects in the cafe¨s, bars, and other places he uses. One can begin to see a little of what I mean by this in Joseph's diary entry at the start of this section. The timing of Joseph's near-daily 10.30 am coffee visit to Duo is structured by the demands of his work obligations. However, the actual feel and content of the visit is generated through how Joseph works the possibilities of being in Duo. His conversation with Scottie the barista is a careful improvisation involving a subtle mix of interest and nonchalance. The``some-what of a friend[ness]'' relationship Joseph has with Scottie is something that has been nurtured and sustained with dexterity. Similarly the casual encounter with Gail (``fellow patron, and friend of Scott'', and later we discover a friend of Joseph, too) is part of the fragile texture of friendship and community which is essential to the webs of sociality which make up Ponsonby Road. My point is not that the interpretative work of Joseph negates the aim of attempting to delineate general trends, or tendencies (compare de Certeau, 1984; Maffesoli, 1996) . Rather, it nudges at a need to recognise the centrality of everyday social practice in the articulation of these tendencies. And it demands methodological and interpretative strategies that build this recognition into their very core.
Which brings us back to Thrift (2000a) and his critique of the cultural turn in human geography, because if there is one thing the cultural turn should have done it is to have provided a route to understand and interpret the world of everyday social practice. And yet, in Thrift's view, one of the roots of cultural geography's methodological conservatism is its failure to take practice seriously enough.
Theorising everyday lifè`I
t cannot be sufficiently stressed that the common-sense world is not a reified and unflexive praxis. It is full of art and humour, it is explored in literature, art, song, film and comic strips. Common-sense knowledge is far from being a poor version of science. It is self-critical and, above all, capable of dealing with the contradiction and paradoxes of social life that otherwise drive sociologists off into utopias, anachronisms, and nostalgias that make ordinary people suspicious of the intellectual's grasp of reality. '' John O'Neill, in Michael Gardiner (2000, pages 6^7) Everyday life and everyday culture are two of the great frontiers of contemporary human geography. As commentators such as David , Louise Crewe (2000) , and Don Mitchell (1999) have noted, the pages of geography journals now teem with an expanding array of articles on topics as diverse as men's lifestyle magazines ; gentrification and the art of dining in ethnic restaurants (May, 1996) ; the sexual politics of lipstick lesbians and gay skinheads (Bell et al, 1994) ; popular photography and the touristic gaze (Crang, 1997) ; women hobos and urban graffiti artists (Cresswell, 1996; ; car-boot sales (Gregson and Crewe, 1997a; 1997b) ; shopping malls and the politics of hanging out (Goss, 1993; Vanderbeck and Johnson, 2000) ; popular music (Kong, 1996; Wall, 2000) ; and the skills of supermarket shopping (Lowe and Wrigley, 2000; . Even that arduous weekly trip to the gym has been opened up to the inquiring cultural geographer (Johnston, 1996) . These articlesödiverse though they undoubtedly areöare united by a conviction that everyday life is a key realm where social power is exercised and maintained, and the everyday simultaneously opens-up new realms of resistance to mainstream networks of power/ knowledge (Barnett, 1998a) . As Steve Pile (1997, page 27) writes:``... power seems to be everywhere, but wherever we look, power is open to gaps, tears, inconsistencies, ambivalences, possibilities for inversion, mimicry, [and] parody. ... At the heart of questions of resistance lie the questions of spatialityöthe politics of lived space.'' Thrift is himself a theorist who is very much interested in the everyday. He describes his work as centrally concerned with the``mundane everyday practices, that shape the conduct of human beings towards others and themselves in particular sites'' (1997a, pages 126^127). Thrift's understanding of practice is ordered through four basic theoretical propositions: (1) that time^space is a fundamental element of social life; (2) that time^space comes into being through social practice; (3) that these practices generate subjectivities through which the world is lived and experienced; and (4) that subjectivities are the products of complex mixtures of human and nonhuman agencies (1996, pages 1^3; 1997a, pages 126^130; 1997b, page 138; 1999a; 1999b) . (2) These four theoretical propositions suggest at least three crucial elements that any accounts of (2) As these propositions are by no means self-evident, below is a more detailed (but still all too brief) outline for those who are new to Thrift's project: (a) Time^space: From his very earliest work on time geography (see 1977a; 1977b; Pred and Thrift, 1981) , Thrift has been concerned with theorising how the social world is constituted not simply through time, but through time^space. As he put it in an early formulation,``[t]he essential unit of geography is not spatial, it lies in regions of time^space and in the relations of such units to ... larger spatio-temporal configurations'' (1977b quoted in 1996, page 1). (b) The sensuousness of practice: To think of time^space in the manner that Thrift does is to see time^space becoming through practiceöthrough the complex interaction of the social action of a range of interlinked subjects (collective and individual, nonhuman as well as human). This is to destabilise radically the dominant social scientific ontologyöfrom positivism through to structural Marxismöwhich views the social world as consisting at root of some kind of coherent, rational, fully graspable, reality (whether that be`social laws',`underlying logics',`deep structure', or whatever). For Thrift this view not only projects a certain kind of scientific wish fulfilment onto the worldöthe world is at core rational just as the social scientist is öit profoundly undervalues the multiplicity of ways the social world has for simply`getting on'. That is to say, it undervalues the ordinary, situated, sensuous, practices through which the social world comes into being. Drawing on a disparate but vigorous practice-oriented intellectual counterculture, Thrift argues that we need to disenchant ourselves of the idea that there is some foundational structure upon which social scientific knowledge can be based and accept that the world is made up of nothing other than complex webs of differing practices. If this can be managed, not only can we begin to revalue``the skills and knowledges [people] get from being embodied beings' ' (1997a, page 126) , but the world we live in becomes fecund with possibility. And the task of the social scientist becomes working towards understanding``what the possible can do with the possible'' (2000a, page 215, italics in original). (c) The subject (or subjectification): Thrift is concerned with the subject. He is interested in how subjectivities are produced within complex (power-inflected) networks of association. This view of the subject (or, as Thrift phrases it in his more recent work, subjectification) frames subjectivity as decentred, but embodied, as something that is not simply the property of an individual actor. As Thrift writes of his own intellectual journey:``My idea of the subject started out by being synonymous with human individuals ... . But it rapidly became clear that I was interpreting these accounts in ways that came perilously close to a Cartesian view of the subject. As a result, I underestimated the importance of the between-ness of joint action, and in general drew the bounds of the subject too tightly so that I was excluding many crucial relations between subjects and objects'' (1996, page 2). (d) Agency: Lastly, to be concerned with the productiveness of practice and with the work of subjectification is also to place the question of agency at the centre of social theoretical work. Here Thrift is interested in``both the production of action and of what counts as action'' (1996, page 2). Linking together all these four concerns is a desire to develop a style of social theory that views the world as performed.
everyday life must contain if they are to be plausible and interesting. First, they must be respectful of the social practices through which the everyday unfolds. They must recognise that much social practice is different (but certainly not inferior) to more contemplative academic modes of being in the world öembedded as they are in the noncognitive, preintentional and commonsensical. Second, they must contain a sense that practices (and thus the subjectivities and agencies of which they are a part) are shot through with creativity and possibility (even though these are`constrained' and limited by existing networks of association). Third, the everyday should not be viewed as a world apart from more rationally grounded realms of social action such as`the state',`the economic',`the political', or whatever. Rather, what needs to be recognised is how all elements of social life, all institutions, all forms of practice are in fact tied together with the work of getting on from day-to-day (compare French, 2000; Thrift, 1996, page 40) .
Seen through the filter of these criteria we can begin to make more sense of the substance source of Thrift's unease with human geographic work about the everyday. 1. Cultural geography's revival was largely built upon a commitment to a particular politics of representation, and it remains obsessively focused on representation. This obsession not only implicitly downgrades the importance of practice, stressing as it does the symbolic over the expressive,``responsive and rhetorical'' (Thrift, 2000b , page 223) dimensions of language. It also has an alarming tendency to a slip into simplistic (and often exaggerated) narratives``based on highly romantic stereotypes of both politics and persons'' (2000a, page 5). Thus, to take an example close to the concerns of this paper, white professionals living in an ethnically diverse area of North London, and eating out at its ethnic restaurants, are not reaching out towards some kind of engagement with the existing community (ambiguous, limited, and inadequate though that may be). No! They are`eating the Other', and are implicated, despite their protestations, in a process of cultural imperialism intricately bound within a complex historical geography of racisms! (May, 1996; see Jackson, 1999) . 2. This example leads neatly to the second limitation. In too much culturally inflected work the everyday is reified as a pure, pristine realm, heroically unbowed by the grubby domination of the powerful. Not only does this unnecessarily romanticise the everyday as a mystical counterweight to dominationöa romanticism embodied in the much-quoted claim of Michel Foucault (1980, page 142) that``there are no relations of power without resistance'' (a romanticising of resistance that is all too evident in Pile's assertion that if``power seems to be everywhere [... it is also] open to gaps, tears, inconsistencies, ambivalences, possibilities for inversion, mimicry, [and] parody''). It also drifts towards a view of everyday practices as escaping completely the grasp of the social researcher, whilst simultaneously disavowing the constitutive role of these practices to networks of domination (Crang, 2000; compare Rose, 1996) . 3. Lastly, in large part because of its obsession with issues of representation, the cultural turn has not equipped human geography to study anything but a relatively narrow range of social theoretical questions. We simply do not have the methodological resources and skills to undertake research that takes the sensuous, embodied, creativeness of social practice seriously. Indeed, counterintuitive though it may sound,``cultural geography is not empirical enough'' (Thrift, 2000a, page 5) . This is a problem that runs deep. In part the difficulty derives from an unwillingness to experiment with techniques that go beyond the now canonical cultural methods: in-depth interviews, focus groups, participant observation of some form or other. This is a conservatism that is reflected in the methodological content and focus of a number of recent (and generally very good) geography textbooks aimed at introducing undergraduates to qualitative research (see Hay, 2001; Hoggart et al, 2002; Limb and Dwyer, 2001) . But even where attempts are made to reach beyond the limitations of these methodsöas is thankfully becoming a little more commonöthe accounts produced are uncomfortably similar to those that preceded them. Thus, to take just one example, Gill Valentine (1999) , in an engaging paper exploring the corporeal geographies of consumption, writes of her aim to think through``how our bodies are linked to wider consumption spaces and the ways that they are inflected by these sociospatial relations'' (page 329). Valentine argues forcefully that accounts of embodiment must encompass``all the senses'' (touch, smell, taste, hearing, as well as the visual) and the``social knowledge'' these enfold (page 331). Nonetheless, despite incorporating methods such as food and photographic and video diaries in addition to in-depth interviews and focus groups, Valentine does not actually demonstrate much interest in the concrete embodiments through which sociospatial relations and bodily practices become. What really matters is talk. Her argument develops through a series of verbatim quotes from focus groups or interviews. Not only do these quotes lack context. Who are these Mikes, Colins, Kates, Carols, and Jackies who appear in the midst of Valentine's theoretical deliberations? Equally troubling is how this talk is made to stand in for all the complexities and subtleties of embodied practice. The cultural geographer canöit would appearöspeak the world to truth through asking her or his research subjects the right questions, and then quoting them back with fidelity in their research reports. (Or, put another way, if we can get our theory representing the world in the right way, we can get our research respondents to as well!) There may be bodies in Valentine's paper but the reader gains little insight into the active, creative, inquisitive practices of embodiment that are such a central part of people's relationship to consumption. (3) But how then can we approach studying the ordinary, the everyday, in ways that actively engage embodiments of social practice as Thrift urges us to? What kinds of methodologies should we employ if we are to be more sensitive to the creativity of practice? Thrift's own solution is to look towards innovations from a range of specialisms in the social sciences and humanities that are organised through a sense of performance. He writes of the possibilities of drawing on methods from the performing arts, from``street theatre, community theatre, legislative theatre'' (2000a, page 3); of methods that work with bodies,``forms of dance and music therapy, contact improvisation''; the work of social psychologists``aimed at boosting relational responsibility by focusing on group interaction''. Thrift is thinking also of performative writing approaches``which have sprung up from disciplines as diverse as anthropology, feminism and performance studies'', as well as``interactive web sites which reform and perform on the internet'' (see also 2000b, pages 244^245; Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000) .
On the question of quite what the geography that will emerge from using (performing) these methodologies will look like, Thrift has so far been reticient. If his recent work on knowledge communities and organisational learning gives some sense of the openness of style in which this work might be written (see Thrift, 1998; 2000c; (3) To my mind, the heart of the problem is that Valentine does not acknowledge the multitude of different ways in which our embodiments are performed. While much of her text gestures at the body (and the embodied) she is uninterested in the ways in which the visual, for example, is actually profoundly shaped by our sense of touch, or how emotional bonds between people are built through physical intimacy. To think through these knowledges foregrounds a series of issues about the extent to which academic writing can in any instance actually come to any understanding of the noncognitive realms of the body. A great deal of recent writing on the body and embodiment has argued that much of what being embodied is about simply escapes the view of the social scientist (Latham, 1996; Scarry, 1985; Shilling, 1993) . This is certainly the case to some degree. What writers like Isabel Allende (1998) and Rebecca Solnit (2001) show is that the question here is not one of representability per se, it is a question of finding the appropriate register and perspective and accepting that something will (and should) escape the process of description.
2000d; 2002), his more social theoretic work is suggestive of nothing less than a drive towards a new methodological avant garde that will radically refigure what it is to do research (see 1999a; 2000a; 2000b) . I want to suggest a slightly different methodological reframing than Thrift. Where Thrift seems determined to push for some kind of rupture in our ways of doing research (a stance that is somewhat ironic given his general distaste for stories of rupture, break, and discontinuity), I want to suggest that, rather than ditching the methodological skills that human geography has so painfully accumulated, we should work through how we can imbue traditional research methodologies with a sense of the creative, the practical, and being with practice-ness that Thrift is seeking (see Crang, 1997; Pratt, 2000; Pred, 1986; 1990a; 1990b) . Pushed in the appropriate direction there is no reason why these methods cannot be made to dance a little.
4 Performing research: part one ö feeling towards a method`.
.. I am convinced that the actual evolution of research ideas does not take place in accord with formal statements we read on research methods. The ideas grow up in part out of our immersion in the data and out of the whole process of living ... '' William Foote White in Mitchell Duneier (1999, page 333) Let us return to Joseph, and the questions posed about researching him and Ponsonby Road at the end of section 2. Joseph isöas we already knowöa subtle and socially sophisticated inhabitant of Ponsonby Road. He knows the casual but intricate etiquette of cafe¨usage, how to carry through a drifting conversation with Scottie as he attends to his barista work, how to work in Gail when she arrives, and he possesses a keen sense of the significance of self-presentation. He is also thoughtful and articulate. Yet, when asked about why he likes Duo, how he would describe his relations to Scottie or indeed Gail, how he learnt to be so adept at doing coffee, he feels put on the spot. Questions such as these were important for me as I groped to understand something of the`structure of feeling' (Harrison, 2000; Williams, 1977) , the tissue of relationships and events, within which the communities of sociability woven through Ponsonby Road were enacted. And, as I will try to demonstrate, making sense of and respecting the reasons why Joseph had difficulty in answering questions about his time spent on Ponsonby Road is centrally important in conceiving methodologies that take the flow of practice and its complex embodied intersubjectivities seriously.
So why did Joseph have difficulty answering? There were, I think, three reasons. The first reason was simply that a good number of these questions simply are not those that Joseph would have much reason to think about in any depth in the usual course of events. The relationships that form the context through which his life is lived are not always under scrutiny or the object of constant deliberation. Indeed, this kind of selfreflection seems somehow out of tune with the ethos of Joseph's (and, as I was to come to appreciate, with many other of my respondents') friendships and social relations on the road (and indeed elsewhere).
The second reason, one closely related to the first, was how I framed my questions. My questions were those of the social scientist, and as such they demanded a style and logic that was not necessarily aligned with the way Joseph thought about his day-to-day life. He does not, for example, need a reason why he likes Duo and it is almost (but not entirely) unreasonable to demand that he has one. Acknowledging this difference not only requires recognition of the need to gain a sense of the frame of reference through which an individual encounters and negotiates his or her world (Emerson et al, 1996; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) . It also means acknowledging and accepting that accounts offered by people may appear by their very nature`indistinct', self-contradictory', or`incomplete'. As John Shotter (in Harrison, 2000, page 502) writes:
``Why shouldn't an expression of a thought or intention öthe saying of a sentence or the doing of a deed, for example öoriginate in a person's vague and unordered feelings or sense of the context they are in?'' This brings us to the third reason for Joseph's inarticulateness. When Shotter invokes a feeling for context as key to why social action unfolds in particular ways, he is gesturing to the importance of social competencies that come through the accretion of embodied experience. For Joseph, a great deal of what he knows and does on Ponsonby Road has accumulated through straightforward usage. Joseph knows what to do, and has an intuitive knowledge of what Ponsonby Road is about, that, if not exactly subconscious, is in certain respects nonconscious, noncognitively oriented, or, as Anthony Giddens (1984, page 7) puts it, is profoundly``practical'' (see Latham, 1996; 1999c; Shotter, 1993; Taussig, 1993) . This knowledge is by no means itself inarticulateöthe expressiveness of Joseph's (and others') use of Ponsonby Road is witness to that. But its logic and sense is not ordered through the discursive and, if we are to find ways of properly accounting for these, we too must think beyond the discursive.
In approaching Ponsonby Road and thinking about methodology, it was initially the problem of how to`get at' (Latham, 1999d , page 182) these practical, routine, knowledges that most concerned me. This was for two reasons. I am interested in the ways in which urban places, particularly urban public places, become through the sensuous interweaving of the lives and daily projects of the thousands of individuals who daily dwell within them. And, as I have suggested with the example of Joseph, a great deal of this`making place' becomes through the work of embodied routine, routines of occupation, and use. Second, it also seemed that one of the most problematic dimensions for the researcher studying the sociality of public spaces (that is, places where people are routinely subject to interaction with strangers) are precisely these routine, noncognitive, embodied aspects and the solidarities that they form: if they are noncognitive, and in large part nonverbal, how can they be included within research? Assuming that they are not entirely of a knowledge that Michel de Certeau (1984, page 93) evocatively characterised as being``as blind as two lovers in each others arms'', one answer is to try to construct a sensitively structured technique through which research subjects can find a space for reflecting upon these practices.
The technique I used to provide such a structure was participant diaries. I first used diaries in a study into everyday experience of public space in an inner-city area of Berlin, which acted as a pilot for my research into Ponsonby Road (see Latham, 1999c) . In that project I asked eleven people living within a few blocks of each other to write a time^space-budget diary of their time spent in public spaces. (For the purposes of the study I used a`commonsensical' de facto definition of public space. This loose definition was negotiated through talking to the diarists about what they held to be in essence`public'.) The hope was that they would produce a detailed time^space budget of their activities. Additionally, however, I also asked my diarists to include a commentary about events in the diary ödetails about how they felt, what they thought about a place, the people they had encountered, and so forth. The diary was then used as the basis for a lengthy interview with the diarist.
In using diaries and diary-interviews I was taking inspiration from two US anthropologists, Don Zimmerman and Lawrence Wieder (1977) . Zimmerman and Wieder had in the early 1970s developed what they called the`diary, diary-interview method' (DDIM) to undertake ethnographic fieldwork in circumstances where the social action of interest is spatially diffuse and`strong observer effects' were likely (1977). The essence of DDIM for Zimmer and Wieder was that the diarist acts as a`proxy observer' who the researcher then interviews in-depth by using the diary to elaborate and (crucially) corroborate what he or she has written. My ambition in employing the DDIM was from the start slightly different from that of Zimmerman and Wieder. My primary aim was to create a framework in which my research subjects could indeed meditate onöor at least be more actively aware oföthe routine and ordinary events of their day, whilst also providing a detailed time^space account of their time in public. This, however, was to prove problematic. Certainly, most people could complete the time^space budgets and write some kind of accompanying commentary. But the stress I was placing on the need for accuracy and completeness in the time^space budgets was alien to a significant number of diarists. The hard logic of the time^space budget, and the effort it required, forced people into accounting for their usage of time and places in ways that were sometimes antithetical to how they ordered (or did not order) their day. Not unlike Joseph with his puzzlement at my direct questions, too much of the structure of the time-budget diary involved the assumption that my frame of reference was indeedöor should beönatural to the diarists. Though the diaryinterview the DDIM did produce interesting accounts of people's ordinary inhabitation of public spaces, this was produced against the grain of (and in some cases almost in spite of ) the subjects' diary time^space budgets.
A further problem arose when it came to interpreting the completed diaries and interviews. In Zimmerman and Wieder's work the privileged position of the ethnographer as an objective scientific observer is not placed in question. Zimmerman and Wieder employed their diarists to act as proxies in situations where it would have been organisationally problematic for the researchers themselves to have been physically present taking notes on events. They were not interested in the diaries as sources in and of themselves, and they were also deeply sceptical of the accounts provided by the diary writers. Indeed, one of the central purposes of the diary-interview was to test the plausibility and robustness of the account provided within individual diaries. The completed diaries and diary-interviews were, once assembled, treated to standard sociological interrogations. Although my diarists had written many interesting things and kept to the basic structure explained before they started writing, none had anything like the detail or resolution one would expect from professionally trained field researchers. And in any case if I was interested in my diarists' personal experience of public spaces, why should I be demanding that they write like an ethnographer? (4) Slowly it dawned on me that, if the world could productively be viewed in terms of sets of practical performances and enactments, the research process itself could, too, be framed as a kind of performance (compare Carlson, 1996; Goffman, 1959; Ingold, 2000; Taussig, 1993) . Viewed in this way it becomes possible to interpret (and carry out) the diary and diary-interview process in a different key to Zimmerman and Wieder. The diary becomes a kind of performance or reportage of the week and the interview a reaccounting, or reperformance. Thus, rather than seeing the idiosyncrasies of individual diarists as a problem, the methodological focus shifts to plugging into (and enabling) respondents' existing narrative resources. And if this suggests a different approach to the idea of the written diary and the following interview, it also suggests the possibility of using techniques such as participant photography alongside the written diary and interview (see Harper, 1998 ). Adopting such a stance does not mean ditching, wholesale, questions of rigour or objectivity for methodological anarchy. But, as Pratt (2000) suggests, it does change our relationship to these issues in a number of subtle and not so subtle ways.
(4) It is exactly against this suspicion of the native's account and privileging of the ethnographer's view that the critiques of modernist ethnographic practice articulated by anthropological commentators such as James Clifford and George Marcus (1986) and others (see Denzin, 1997) as well as by feminist scholars (see Smith, 1990; Trinh, 1989; was directed. The metaphor of performance ösurprisingly, given its current popularityöhas a wellestablished lineage of usage within the social sciences and humanities. Within sociology, ethnomethodologists and symbolic interactionists such as Erving Goffman (1959; 1963; and Howard Garfinkel (1967) drew heavily on dramatological metaphors in their research into everyday interactions. More recently, Judith Butler (1990; has used the term`performativity' to theorise how gender is reproduced through everyday social practices. (5) Equally, the more radical appropriation of performance advocated by Thrift draws on work from theatre studies and performance art rooted in a heterodox tradition which arguably reaches back to Dada, and includes the agitprop theatre of the 1960s and 1970s, Situationist International with their de¨rives and de¨tournements, community theatre, and body art (Carlson, 1996; Tulloch, 1999) . As Nicky Gregson and Gillian Rose (2000) have argued, it is the work of Goffman and Garfinkel that has most influenced work in human geography (see Crang, 1994; Nash, 2000) . However, one of the primary inspirations of my turn to the performed was more prosaic. The idea of day-to-day life as involving an element of performance is pervasive in contemporary popular culture (this is as true in New Zealand as it is throughout much of the Western world). This can be seen in the heightened attention to self-presentation and self-fashioning evident in the evolution of many postwar urban subcultures. It is also evident in the popularity and success of`reality'-based and diarybased programmes on television and radio (compare Chambers, 1986; Giddens, 1991; Mort, 1996; Stephens, 1998) . In reflecting on this popular culture, it also occurred to me that rather than just using writing (the diary) and talk (the diary-interview) it also made sense to try and draw more directly on people's visual imaginations. Hence, I provided each of my diarists with a disposable camera with which they were asked to take photographs of interesting and/or significant places and events of their week (on the use of photography and social research, see Harper, 1998) .
For some diarists such as Josephöan aspiring actor, rememberöor Miranda who works in fashion publishing``where presentation is very important'' (interview transcript, 1999) my suggestion that the production of the diary (written and photographic) be viewed as a kind of performance-cum-reportage of their week fitted closely to their established frames of self-reference. For other diarists the self as a carefully studied performance was slightly further from their personal views of themselves. Nonetheless, the suggestion that the diary should be viewed as a performance, an intimate reportage of their week out and about in Auckland, was not an alien idea. What is more, in addition to the intuitive intelligibility of the idea of the diary (written and photographic) as a performance or reportage to diarists, the suggestion also functioned as a vehicle for individuals to create a gap between their everyday self and their diary-writing self. This was important in making it easier for diarists to write about themselves. In essence they were putting less of themselves on the line: less than would be demanded if the emphasis was on producing a absolutely`truthful' account of their week, and less than in Zimmerman and Wieder's original framing of the diarist as proxy ethnographer seeking a total recall of events. Now clearly the framing of the research relationship and research activity as performance employed in my use of the diary-photograph, diary-interview method (DPDIM), is less radical than that suggested by Thrift and employed by Pratt in her work with the Vancouver Philippine Women's Centre. My diarists were still given a basic framework which it was stressed was important to follow. Equally, the concluding in-depth interview followed a structured format that in its essentials did not vary greatly from diarist to diarist. Imposing this degree of structure on the diarist might seem to run contrary to the ethos of the turn towards performance which I am arguing for in this paper. However, the objective in providing this structure was to provide a basic narrative outline or pattern for the diarists of what a diary might look like. Diarists were then encouraged to improvise around and extend the basic diary format I had outlined to them. So, whereas Joseph produced a diary that was pithy and concise in both its written and photographic elements (see the introductory quote to section 2), in the diary quoted at the start of this section, Paul Rennie Brown, a welldressed real-estate agent in his early forties, produced a surreal series of diary entries and photographs. Borrowing from James Bond films (the refrain``my name is Paul ... Paul Rennie Brown'' is the connecting element through the diary), film noir and detective-novel noir (the diary begins with lines``Of all the booze-barns and gin joints in this town ...''), new journalism (``He's lining up pure cane sugar on the table, cutting it up and using the coffee straws to SUCK it up his nose''), comic books (the diary is illustrated with sketches, and elements of the narrative have a cartoon-like feel, as do many of his photographs that are posed and exaggerated) amongst other narrative sources, Paul self-consciously turns himself into a character in his diary.
Similarly, the diary-photograph-interview offered a structured context within which the diary writer and I could discuss and revisit the events described in the diary. Elaborating, for example, on his description of Wendy's, Paul explains, prompted by my question as to whether he likes Wendy's and whether he would go there if it was not for his son Isaac,`Y eah, I do go to Wendy's actuallyöI like their chilli con carne! Wendy's is bland but it's good. Out of the fast food chains, it's one of the better ones. The food's a little bit more realögood chilli con carne, good potatoes. [laughs] It's all going too fast.'' Through this recounting of the diary, Paul not only helps to clarify and define what he wrote in the diary, he offers a parallel account to that provided in the diary: where the diary offers a hectic, hyperbolic, surrealistic, narrative, the interview offers a more cautious, banal perspective. Now, the work of conversationally recounting and reenacting the week is similar in many ways to established qualitative interviewing techniques. Most accounts of interviews and related qualitative methodologies stress the need to build up a rapport with research subjects, the need to be alert to misunderstandings, and the importance of clarifying points of mutual misunderstanding (Fielding, 1993; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Kvale, 1996; Mason, 1996; Miller and Glassner, 1997) . Where the framing of the research process as the kind of performative practice (or enacting) being argued for here breaks from some of the more-established norms of interview-based qualitative research is in its insistence on the incompleteness and event-ness with which the whole research process is shot through. The parallel narratives of the diary and diary-interview offered by Paul do not sum together to produce a single unified narrative as they were seen to do by Zimmerman and Wieder. Instead, they present the researcher with an interrelated mosaic of interpretative snapshots and vignettes of a particular social space and set of social practices in the making.
What does this mean in practical terms? I want to highlight two areas that define my own engagement with the performative, practice-oriented nature of social life:
The partialness of accounts
I have in the preceding argument repeatedly stressed the importance of recognising the degree to which the world is made through the work of practical, sensual, social action. If we leave aside for the moment the not-insubstantial question of the solidity and enduring nature of the institutions reproduced through this practical, sensual, social action (see Bourdieu, 1984; Taussig, 1993) , such an ontology demands that we preserve a sense of openness and possibility within our accounts of the world even when these accounts are about the ways in which certain institutions, certain facts, certain ways of thinking and acting appear utterly natural and immutable (compare Callon and Latour, 1981; Hetherington, 1997; Latour, 1988; Thrift, 1996; . If this ontological stance is fundamentally optimistic in tone, it nonetheless has some important implications for how we understand the reach and certainty of the knowledge we as social scientists produce. First, it suggests we need, in interpreting interviews and related empirical material, to be more sensitive than we have been in the past to the partial-ness and moment-ness of the accounts offered. An interview, even a series of interviews or diaries and diary-interviews, does not provide a definitive account of an event, place, or individual. Of course, this is to restate a commonplace (and fairly obvious) conclusion of poststructuralist and postmodern critiques of social scientific knowledge (Denzin, 1997; Rose, 1993; . But what I am arguing goes beyond the too-familiar qualification that our knowledge is`partial' and`situated'. Take, for example, the following verbatim quote from Joseph's diary-interview describing his use of Duo. The quote follows directly from the diary extract at the start of the section 2:
1: Alan:``Ahmmm, So you drove to work? Ahmmm. This is just a basic how do you get to work que[stion. '' Like Paul's diary-interview quote above, Joseph's recounting of his week presents us with some interesting perspectives on how he uses hospitality spaces. It also begins to contextualise his relations with Scottie and others at Duo. Indeed, this excerpt seems to offer us a rather neat narrative leading to the conclusion that Duo is very much like the bar in the television situation comedy Cheers.
Careful attention to the rhetorical construction of the interchange between Joseph and myself, however, offers a slightly different interpretation. Answering my initial question (1 and 3) which leads us to the first diary reference to Duo, Joseph tries to recount when he first encountered Duo (4), a narrative thread that I interrupt with my question about the owner, who has not before been mentioned (5). Replying to my interruption (6), Joseph starts to continue his story, when he is again interrupted by a further rather stupid question from me about Tony (7). This interruption leads to a short uncertain detour as Joseph seeks to explain Tony's recent absence from Duo, followed by a return to his initial narrative of how he discovered Duo. Again I interrupt his flow (9), this time with a question trying to clarify what he thought about being accosted on the street. Joseph answers very briefly while attempting to stick to his narrative about Duo (10, 12) . He explains how the staff at Duo looked after him, offering the very concrete example of how Tony replaced his original coffee because he was``not happy with that coffee''. Giving narrative structure to what he has said so far, Joseph pauses and then offers me the definition,``it's a bit like Cheers, you know?'' This``it's a bit like Cheers, you know?'' is a practical rhetorical device aimed to help my comprehension of Joseph's story, which neatly evokes and summarises through use of a commonplace cultural reference the ethos of Duo suggested in the preceding description of Tony replacing his coffee. Joseph then further clarifies what he means with the final set of vague but again very evocative couplets (16^18):``You go in there and everyone knows you name and [A:``Yeah''] you joke around relaxed and happy and good'' (see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Bilig, 1987; Heritage, 1997; Potter, 1997; Shotter, 1993; Silverman, 1998) .
What is clear from the structure of the extended extract is that Joseph has a relation to Duo that outruns the neat idea of Cheers, even as the Cheers analogy helps me (and Joseph) to make sense of Joseph's relationship to it. Indeed, it is clear that the Cheers statement is not one that is meant to be taken literally. Reading the extract (and indeed the entire interview) with attention to the way it is rhetorically structured highlights that what Joseph is presenting is an account in the making. Just as Joseph negotiates Ponsonby Road anew each time he uses it, the interview, too, is a negotiation of a relationship to the events outlined in his diary. The more he and I talk about it, the more detail and perspectives I get on Joseph's relationship to Ponsonby Road. But this is not leading to a single unified truth about either Joseph or Ponsonby Road. At the same time, attention to the rhetorical content helps to make apparent through the gaps and ambiguities of this account interesting aspects of his relationships to others and the world. This is worth reiterating. The notion of the interview as a kind of performance helps us to avoid thinking of the self as fundamentally an issue of depth. As David Silverman (1997) has argued, the very idea of the interview is bound up with a hermeneutics of the soul that is similarly closely related to the technologies of the confessional, and those of the mass media. All too often this works towards à`r econstruction of a common and unitary construction of the self'' (Silverman and Atkinson in Silverman, 1997, page 248) . The notion of performance helps to deflect us away from looking for depth (in the sense of a single unified truth) and directs us towards detail (in the sense of a fuller and more variegated picture of the interviewee).
This brings us to another issue generated by acknowledging the partial-ness and moment-ness of the research process: how can our final published accounts fairly suggest their partial-ness and moment-ness whilst still saying something interesting and useful about the world they describe? Again this is to go beyond the usual qualifiers about partial-ness and situated-ness that prefix much qualitative research in geography. Nor is the issue simply one of greater reflexivity within the writing process. Rather, the need is to work towards creating more supple and pluralistic accounts of the social events we are describing. And to do this requires an approach to writing that is more experimental and pragmatic than is currently evident within mainstream social and cultural geography.
The need for new approaches to writing
One of the curiosities of the cultural turn within human geography is how repeated calls for new ways of writing (Pile and Rose, 1992; Pile and Thrift, 2000; Pred, 1986) have failed to have any but the most marginal impact on the ways geographers write. Of course, it is possible to point to a number of examples of attempts to write differently (see McCormack, 2002; Pred, 1986; 1990a; 1990b; , and much of the movement towards performance outlined in previous sections is associated with self-conscious attempts to write in new ways (Dewsbury, 2000; Hinchliff, 2000; Pratt, 2000; Thrift, 2000b) . Nonetheless, there are a number of difficulties with the ways that calls for new approaches to writing have been framedötwo of which I would like to highlight here.
First, although there are obvious parallels between the notion of social life as a performative practice and writing being similarly performative, it does not follow that the writing produced through this knowledge must constantly be self-conscious about its performed-ness. Perhaps because of its interest in the artistic and philosophical avant gardes, a great deal of writing on performance has adopted a remarkably dense, elliptical, highly stylised approach. (6) If such writing has its uses, there is no reason why other ömore reader-friendlyöapproaches should not also be employed. Working to create written accounts that contain a sense of partial-ness and plurality and that are attuned with the performance ethos described in this paper requires two things: (a) greater attention to ways of writing that so far have been more closely associated with the humanities or indeed journalism (compare Thrift, 2000a); , more thought about how these ways of writing can be used along with our established literary conventions. (7) So, second, it follows from this that, along with thinking about new ways of writing human geography (and the ways we can acquire these writing skills), there is a need to explore how older ways of doing human geography (and, indeed, social science) can inform this newness. Now obviously, as has been stressed at a number of places in this paper, much of the cultural turn in human geography has been written as a critique of the established norms of doing human geography (compare section 3). For example, by drawing on feminist commentators like Donna Haraway (1997), diagrammatic representations of social relationships have been characterised as a fetishisation of actual lived relations. In a similar manner, attempts to reach purely objectively reasoned conclusions have been critiqued as involving a masculinist will to power (see Barnes, 2001; Rose, 1993) . The difficulty with these critiques is that they have generally been undertaken and read with a lack of subtlety and modesty. (8) It is possible to alter the stance with which we interpret and employ established bodies of geographical knowledge that for many have come to seem of dubious use without succumbing to Haraway's much mentioned`God trick' (Barnes, 2001, page 529) . (9) Take time-geography as a brief example. Time-geography is currently deeply unfashionable ö its diagrams and maps seem profoundly out of sync with the contemporary cultural zeitgeist. Nonetheless, rereading some of the more important time-geography texts suggests a range of strikingly productive ways of thinking about the rhythm of people's inhabitation of time^space (see Ha« gerstrand, 1975; 1976; 1982; Pred, 1977) . Readers will remember that Torsten Ha« gerstrand and other key (6) This is a charge I freely own up to in some of my earlier writing about everyday practices (1996; 1999a) . My point is not that such writing is in and of itself wrongöused judiciously it can help us understand and think about theoretical problems in new and interesting ways. The difficulty is when this becomes a kind of de facto norm concerning how one should write about such issues. (7) I am thinking here of both the kind of critiques of conventional qualitative research contained in the likes of Paul Atkinson (1990 ), Norman Denzin (1997 , and James Clifford and George Marcus (1986) as well as the inspiration and guidance that can be obtained from such diverse literary forms as the so-called new journalism (see Capote, 1966; Didion, 1968; Wolfe, 1975) and journalistic hybrids such as Franc°ois Maspero (1994) , Jonathan Raban (1974; , Andrew Ross (1999) , and Patrick Wright (1991) . (8) My thanks to one of the anonymous referees for suggesting these terms. (9) Indeed, it seems many researchers focused on doing qualitative work have a somewhat distorted view of the ways many quantitative researchers view their work. The popular notion that quantitative research equals positivism is in general neither fair nor accurate (see Batty and Longley, 1994; Dorling and Fairburn, 1997) .
time-geographers believed that through a detailed mapping of the structuring of individual and institutional projects in time^space one could build up a carefully contextualised understanding of the processes through which societies maintain and reproduce themselves. To this aim, Ha« gerstrand and his colleagues devoted themselves to developing a notational language through which just such a mapping of this`choreography' of movement and interaction could be undertaken (Pred, 1977, page 207) .
Perhaps the most well-known elements of this notational language were timegeography's time^space graphs. These graphs plotted out the movement of individuals through time^space over the course of the day. Offering only a ghosting of the movement of the body through the environmentöHa« gerstrand (1982, pages 323^324) himself recognised that the plotting of a life path seemed``to represent nothing more than a point on the move''öthese mappings have been thoroughly critiqued by feminist and cultural geographers. In perhaps the most strenuousöcertainly the most influentialöof these critiques, Rose (1993, pages 29^31) argued that time-geography presents a mechanical, lifeless, profoundly masculinist, picture of society. Such critiques have a good deal of validity. But reinterpreted through these critiques, and if the final research text is itself considered as a kind of performance, it is possible to imagine ways of working with narrative devices like time^space graphs that recognise both their productiveness and their partiality.
At its most basic this could involve simply using conventional time^space graphs to plot, say, a typical day in Paul Rennie Brown's life, whilst explicitly stressing the limitations of such a representation. Such a graph is a useful heuristic device to outline something of the spatial^temporal rhythm of Brown's day (see Latham, 1999d; 2003b; compare Dyck, 1990, page 470) . However, thinking about the notion of performance also encourages us to consider ways of playing with and actively reworking established techniques such as the time^space graph. Figures 1 and 2 (over) , for example, take the basic framework of the time^space graph. They retain the underlying spatialt emporal grid (that is, distance on the x-axis and clock time on the y-axis), but they attempt to convey a sense of the fluidity and feel of Paul (figure 1) and Miranda's (figure 2) movement through Auckland. Constructed through a bricolage of quotes from their diaries and diary-interviews (the typed texts in quotation marks in the figures), along with the use of the diarists' photographs and commentary from me (the non-quotation-mark typed text that provides a basic commentary and the handwritten text which offers background information) these figures aim to lead the reader into the diarists' world (compare Ingold, 2000) . Whilst designed with a serious intent, these diagrams are also meant to be playful and engaging. They are also designed to be suggestive of their own partiality; hence the use of handwritten text, freehand sketching, and so forth, along with computer-processed text and graphics. Importantly, these diagramsö or time^space collages ö are not intended to replace or stand in for more recognisable ethnographic accounts. They are meant to provide an additional set of narrative resources through which the reader can gain a sense of the texture of the relationships the researcher is seeking to describe (Latham, 2002c; 2003b) . Through such experimentation with different forms of presenting and narrating research results, we can not only enliven our sense of what human geography should look like, but also begin to appreciate more fully how different styles of approaching the research process itself itself can and should be reshaping the existing all-too-narrow conventions about what a final, polished, piece of human geographic research should look like. 
Conclusion
To start with performance and end with time-geography may seem an odd trajectory. But the argument of this paper is rooted in a conviction that the metaphor of performance offers more than yet another new way of doing human geography. Although the arguments of writers such as Thrift (1996; 2000a; 2000b) and others exploring ideas of performance (see Dewsbury, 2000; Harrison, 2000; Hinchliff, 2000) can be read as an effort to establish something like a new paradigm within human geography (Nash, 2000) , they do not have to be. Rather, the tone of their writing can be seen more in terms of an attempt to alter the style in which human geography is done (compare McCormack, 2002; Spinosa et al, 1997; Thrift, 2000c) . Approached from the appropriate angle, the movement towards a framing of the social world based around terms such as enactment, performance, and practice offers a possibility for a range of creative dialogues between already-established forms of human geographic writing and, more obviously, novel approaches to doing human geography. The sense of playfulness, as-if-ness, plurality, combined with a genuine curiosity about the ways that social life is ordered and carried through, does not only encourage us to explore new realms of social action. That is to say, it not only encourages us to think about a wide range of social phenomena such as the body, emotions, nonhuman objects, the everyday, in ways that take us beyond an obsession with a politics of representation. It also presents an opportunity to reinterpret and reappropriate established methodologies and ways of writing human geography that transcend the anxious culture of critique which has marked so much of the turn towards the cultural (compare Barnett, 1998a; 1998b) . Indeed, in place of this anxious culture it is possible to see the emergence of an energetic methodological pluralism that is both reinvigorating and transforming the ways in which we think about human geography.
Clearly, to realise the opportunities of this contemporary interest in performance requires more than simply trying to reframe our theoretical talk in terms of practice and performance. It requires a broadminded openness to methodological experimentation and pluralism within human geography, and the allowance of a certain amount of methodological naivete. As I have tried to suggest with the example of my own use of DPDIM, this experimentation can be relatively modest. After all, the purpose behind the diaries, photographs, and interviews produced with Joseph, Miranda, Paul, and others was to try and build up an account of Auckland's public life: (a) that was respectful to the people and communities involved in its making; and (b) that had a certain truthfulness [a truthfulness consisting both of an intellectual rigour as well as a certain emotional resonance (see Kindon and Latham, 2002; Latham, 2002b; 2002c) ]. Such an approach, in dialogue with the more radical methodological accounts being developed by people such as Pratt (2000) and Thrift (2000a) , can help make for a more dynamic and more empirically engaging style of human geography.
